



Joint Maritime Information Center



JMIC Weekly Dashboard

Week 39

22nd – 28th September 2024




Weekly Executive Summary



Incident No.	Information Note No.	Vessel Name

Weekly Assessment:
 Despite targeting of U.S. Navy assets, there were no Houthi attacks on civilian vessels to report. The Houthis maintain the capability and intent to target vessels with a perceived association to US, UK, or Israel.
 Salvage operations continue on the M/T SOUNION.

Since 19 th November 2023	
Total number of Incidents <i>(excluding coalition engagements)</i>	100 (0 new this week)
Total Mariners Killed	4 (0 new this week)
Total Mariners Severely Injured	2 (0 new this week)





JMIC update on incident No. 93 M/T SOUNION

29th SEPTEMBER 2024

21st August 2024 | SOUNION (Ongoing Event) | (Multiple) Attacks / Salvage Operation | Southern Red Sea | JMIC Incident No. 93

Background history

On 21st August 2024 there was an attack on the Greek-flagged **M/T SOUNION** (IMO: 9312145) by small boats, unknown airborne projectiles and a USV. All projectiles impacted the starboard quarter, damaging the engine compartment and starting a fire. This has been confirmed by JMIC.

Previous Update as of 21st of September:

- The vessel is at anchor (17 08N 039 48E) and all support vessels on site
- Final preparations for firefighting and inert gas expected to be completed soon
- Following firefighting operations, ship to ship transfer plan to be executed

Latest Update as of 29th of September +39 days after the incident occurred:

- **The firefighting operation onboard M/T SOUNION commenced Monday 23 September, 2024 by a team of international experts on site.**
- **The operation has proceeded with promising results as some fires are extinguished and other under control.**



“The operation to make safe the SOUNION has entered a critical phase. A team of international experts is engaged in a complex stabilization and firefighting operation.”

M/T SOUNION



JMIC Advisory Note

29th September 2024 | JMIC Advisory Note 29th Sept '24 (01)

This advisory note is to ensure seafarers remain vigilant and exercise caution within the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and their approaches.

Despite a drop in attacks against merchant vessels over the last two weeks, the Houthis have shown ability and willingness to target U.S. Navy assets and coalition partners. JMIC assesses that the Houthi capability and intent to target vessels **remains high** based on current Houthi messaging.

The JMIC urges vessels and maritime industry to review and implement the Ships Security Plan well in advance of the threat area, utilize Best Management Practices, and report anomalous or suspicious activities to the respective reporting centers (such as UKMTO). This information is critical to pattern-of-life assessment and creates greater situational awareness in the maritime for all stakeholders.

Examples may include:

- UAV or USV sightings
- Loitering groups of dhows or skiffs with no indication of fishing activities
- Suspicious or harassing communications
- Any anomalous behavior no matter how trivial it may seem

It is the collective effort from all military and commercial maritime organizations that will reassure industry in the support of the free flow of commerce and freedom of navigation.



Complete List of Merchant Vessels Incidents

Since 19th November 2023 (1 of 2)

	I/N	Date	Name	IT	VT	AA	
NOV.	1	19/11/23	GALAXY LEADER				
	2	25/11/23	CENTRAL PARK				
	3	26/11/23	CENTRAL PARK				
DECEMBER	4	03/12/23	NUMBER 9				
	5	03/12/23	UNITY EXPLORER				
	6	03/12/23	AOM SOPHIE II				
	7	09/12/23	PANTA REI 1				
	8	10/12/23	CENTAURIUS LEADER				
	9	11/12/23	STRINDA				
	10	13/12/23	ARDMORE ENCOUNTER				
	11	14/12/23	MAERSK GILBRATAR				
	12	15/12/23	AL JASRAH				
	13	15/12/23	MSC ALANYA				
	14	15/12/23	MSC PALATIUM 3				
	15	18/12/23	SWAN ATLANTIC				
	16	18/12/23	MSC CLARA				
	17	23/12/23	SAI BABA				
	18	23/12/23	BLAAMANEN				
	19	24/12/23	MSC SILVANA				
	20	26/12/23	MSC UNITED III				
	21	28/12/23	MSC BEIRA IV				
	22	30/12/23	MAERSK HANGZHOU				
	JANUARY	23	02/01/24	CMA CGM TAGE			
		24	09/01/24	GREEN BAY			
		25	12/01/24	KHALISSA			
26		15/01/24	GIBRALTAR EAGLE				
27		16/01/24	ZOGRAFIA				
28		17/01/24	GENCO PICARDY				
29		18/01/24	CHEM RANGER				
30		24/01/24	MAERSK DETROIT				
31		24/01/24	MAERSK CHESAPEAKE				
32		26/01/24	MARLIN LUANDA				
33		29/01/24	PANTA REI 1				

	I/N	Date	Name	IT	VT	AA
FEBRUARY	34	01/02/24	KOI			
	35	06/02/24	STAR NASIA			
	36	06/02/24	MORNING TIDE			
	37	12/02/24	STAR IRIS			
	38	15/02/24	LYCAVITOS			
	39	16/02/24	POLLUX			
	40	18/02/24	RUBYMAR			
	41	19/02/24	SEA CHAMPION			
	42	19/02/24	NAVIS FORTUNA			
	43	21/02/24	LAVENDER			
	44	22/02/24	ISLANDER			
	45	24/02/24	TORM THOR			
	46	27/02/24	-			
	MARCH	47	04/03/24	MSC SKY II		
48		06/03/24	TRUE CONFIDENCE			
49		08/03/24	PROPEL FORTUNE			
50		11/03/24	PINOCCHIO			
51		14/03/24	PACIFIC 01			
52		15/03/24	MADO			
53		23/03/24	HUANG PU			
APRIL		55	06/04/24	HOPE ISLAND		
	56	24/04/24	MAERSK YORKTOWN			
	57	25/04/24	MSC DARWIN VI			
	58	26/04/24	ANDROMEDA STAR			
	59	29/04/24	CYCLADES			
MAY	60	06/05/24	MSC DIEGO / MSC GINA			
	61	17/05/24	WIND			
	62	23/05/24	YANNIS			
	63	28/05/24	LAAX			

	I/N	Date	Name	IT	VT	AA
JUNE	64	01/06/24	ABLIANI			
	65	06/06/24	AAL GENOA			
	66	08/06/24	NORDERNEY			
	67	08/06/24	MSC TAVVISHI			
	68	09/06/24	NORDERNEY			
	69	12/06/24	TUTOR			
	70	13/06/24	VERBENA			
	71	13/06/24	SEAGUARDIAN			
	72	16/06/24	CAPTAIN PARIS			
	73	21/06/24	TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR			
	74	23/06/24	TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR			
JULY	75	24/06/24	MSC SARAH V			
	76	25/06/24	LILA LISBON			
	77	27/06/24	SEAJJOY			
	78	28/06/24	DELONIX			
	80	30/06/24	SUMMER LADY			
	81	09/07/24	MAERSK SENTOSA			
	82	10/07/24	MOUNT FUJI			
	83	11/07/24	ROSTRUM STOIC			
	84	15/07/24	BENTLEY I			
	85	15/07/24	CHIOS LION			
AUGUST	86	19/07/24	LOBIVIA			
	87	20/07/24	PUMBA			
	88	03/08/24	GROTON			
	89	08/08/24	DELTA BLUE			
	90	12/08/24	DELTA ATLANTICA			
	91	13/08/24	ON PHOENIX			
	92	15/08/24	SIAM & SUNNY OCEAN			
	93	21/08/24	SOUNION			
	94	21/08/24	SW NORTH WIND I			
	95	26/08/24	CAROLINE BEZENGI			
	96	27/08/24	MUTRIBA			
	97	30/08/24	GROTON			

Incident Type (IT):
Attack (Serious Incident)
Attack (Minor Incident)
Attempted Attack/Targeted
Hijack
Suspicious Activities

Vessel Type (VT):
Bulk
Tanker
Passenger
Container
RORO
Other

Assessed Association (AA):
Israel
UK
US
No Direct Association
Outdated Association

Note 1. As per the request of the owners, some vessel names and details on attacks may not be disclosed

Note 2. 'SI' means *Special Information Note* (outside the original JMIC Area of responsibility) at the time of publishing



Complete List of Merchant Vessels Incidents

Since 19th November 2023 (2 of 2)

	IN	Date	Name	IT	VT	AA
SI	98	02/09/24	BLUE LAGOON I	Attack (Minor Incident)	Attack (Serious Incident)	Assessed Association
	99	02/09/24	OIL TANKER	Attack (Minor Incident)	Attack (Serious Incident)	Assessed Association
	100	21/09/24	DILIGENT WARRIOR	Attack (Serious Incident)	Attack (Minor Incident)	Assessed Association

Incident Type (IT):

- Attack (Serious Incident)
- Attack (Minor Incident)
- Attempted Attack/Targeted
- Hijack
- Suspicious Activities

Vessel Type (VT):

- Bulk
- Tanker
- Passenger
- Container
- RORO
- Other

Assessed Association (AA):

- Israel
- UK
- US
- No Direct Association
- Outdated Association


Note 1. As per the request of the owners, some vessel names and details on attacks may not be disclosed

Note 2. 'SI' means *Special Information Note* (outside the original JMIC Area of responsibility) at the time of publishing



Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities

Since 19th November 2023







Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels

Since 19th November 2023

Incidents by Vessel Type



Incidents by Assessed Association



Direct Association: The vessel itself has made a recent port call to Israel, or the Owner, Operator, Charterer, Manager or Flag State is Israeli, US or UK.


No Direct Association: Other vessels within the company structure that have made one or more recent port calls to Israel.




Month by Month Comparison of Incidents

(Last 6 months)


APRIL 2024 (6 Incidents)




MAY 2024 (4 Incidents)




JUNE 2024 (16 Incidents)




JULY 2024 (7 Incidents)



AUGUST 2024 (11 Incidents)



SEPTEMBER 2024 (3 Incidents as of 29th SEP)



Observations and Assessments


The Houthis maintain the capability and intent to target vessels with a perceived association to US, UK, or Israel. With less opportunity as vessels are transiting the Cape of Good Hope or no longer transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden, it should be expected that the Houthis will continue to look for any type of association to target innocent shipping.




Incidents by Type

Since 19 November 2023


MISSILE (75 incidents)




UAV (18 incidents)




SMALL CRAFT (15 incidents)



USV (12 incidents)



HIJACK (5 incidents)




Note:
Incidents with more than one incident-type will appear in all applicable charts

- Legend**
- Attack (Serious Incident)
 - Attack (Minor Incident)
 - Attempted Attack/Targeted
 - Hijack
 - Suspicious Activities



Heatmap of Incidents and Suspicious Activities

Since 19th November 2023



Note:

All positions shown are approximate and only presented for the purpose of highlighting the frequency of incidents


Correct as of 28 Sep 2024




Trending of Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels

Since 19th November 2023

Week-on-Week Comparison of All Reported Houthi Activity Towards Merchant Vessels (since 19 November 2023)



Month-on-Month Comparison of All Reported Houthi Activity Towards Merchant Vessels (since 19 Nov 2023)




Observations and Assessments
 Based on trending, the number of Houthi attacks on merchant vessels last week was below average. Refer to the 'JMIC Guidance to Industry' slide. Week-on-Week and Month-on-Month average displayed as red dotted line. This will be updated to reflect values for the current reporting period.



AIS Statistics

Attacks/Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels



Totals

Incidents:	100 ⁽¹⁾
AIS ON:	49
AIS OFF:	51
Successful ⁽²⁾ attacks:	35
Unsuccessful attacks:	65

⁽¹⁾ One incident with unknown details not included

⁽²⁾ "Successful" meaning attack with hit resulting in any damage to vessel

Serious Incidents⁽³⁾

Total number:	6
AIS ON:	4
AIS OFF:	2

⁽³⁾ Incidents resulting in:

- Abandoned Ship
- Vessel Sunk
- Death
- Major Fire

Observations and Assessments

AIS on or off does not appear to have an impact on whether or not a vessel will be targeted. However, if targeted, based on the available data vessels with AIS off are less likely to be hit.



Definitions – Incident types

General Categories	Explanatory Notes
Attack (Serious Incident)	The result of a deliberate launching of weapons (i.e missiles, drones), and/or ramming into a vessel that results in serious damage to the vessel. The attack is deemed serious if any resulting damage impacts the vessel's ability to continue functioning, which requires immediate assistance. It includes a vessel deemed a total loss, and significant threat to lives.
Attack (Minor Incident)	The result of a deliberate launching of weapons (i.e missiles, drones), and/or ramming into a vessel that results in either a miss or minor damage to the vessel. The attack is deemed minor if any resulting damage does not impact the vessel's ability to continue functioning and/or does not require immediate assistance.
Attempted Attack/Targeted	This refers to the act of targeting a vessel with the use of force that results in a miss and no damage to the vessel. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Any use of force including but not limited to launching of weapons (i.e. missiles, drones), and/or ramming into the vessel.• No damage may include but not limited to missile ditching, and/or coalition warships shooting down missiles and/or drones.
Hijack	Is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will.
Suspicious Activities	This refers to any act of activity near the vessel that is enough to warrant suspicion. To include aerial, surface, and subsurface activities.



JMIC Guidance to Industry

Vessels intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:

- a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area
- b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intra-ship UHF/VHF transmissions and AIS) in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area, is to be very carefully considered as part of the voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting
 - i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise the safety & security of the vessel and crew
 - ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
- d. Do not loiter when transiting the threat area and proceed with caution
- e. If contacted by any unrecognized organization:
 - i. Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
- f. **If contacted on VHF by unverified vessels or “Yemeni Navy”:**
 - i. **Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so**
 - ii. **Describe the incident in follow up reports to UKMTO**
- g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
 - i. UAV sightings
 - ii. Communications challenges
- h. In case of unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
 - i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
 - ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
 - iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
 - iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)
- i. Use of Best Management Practices (BMP) should be considered
 - i. Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG

Maritime Industry is recommended to:

- a. Conduct a threat & risk assessment of all associated vessels and especially those that may have previous USA, UK or Israel ownership or associations *[to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure]*
- b. Companies should plan and implement risk mitigation measures in advance of the furthest identified attack areas as depicted in the JMIC ‘*Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities*’ slide
- c. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
- d. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
- e. Review digital footprint including AIS policy
- f. The JMIC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators
 - i. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
 - ii. Any response should be carefully considered
 - iii. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi’s Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company’s CSO
- g. Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual
 - i. JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy



About Us

The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) is an entity operating in close cooperation with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The JMIC seeks, where possible, participation from multiple military stakeholders including Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and Information Fusion Centers (IFC) specialists to fuse open-source unclassified information into a truthful messaging service for the maritime industry.

The JMIC has been established to support the Shipping Industry with challenges faced when operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden under threat conditions from a non-state actor. The JMIC is aligned to the principle that all vessels are entitled to Freedom of Navigation and seafarers supporting the legitimate movement of global trade are unhindered. The information shared by the JMIC endeavors to offer advice, and where prudent, military guidance only to help inform any Threat and Risk Assessment process. This framework is not a legally binding commitment. The JMIC is to:

1. Provide accurate incident information to enable risk assessment by shipping industry to support operational planning and decision making.
2. Provide clear and concise updates and guidance to the shipping industry – where possible, to aim to be the “authoritative source of information.”

JMIC information concentrates on non-state actor attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, Bab Al Mandeb (BAM) and Gulf of Aden (GOA), however, this may extend outside the defined area based on threat expansion.



NEW! JMIC releases Bridge Emergency Reference Cards for the Shipping Industry

JMIC

Joint Maritime Information Center

Bridge Emergency Reference Cards

Middle East



Combined Maritime Forces
combinedmaritimeforces.com/combined-task-forces

JMIC Products
www.ukmto.org/partner-products/jmic-products

Created in Partnership with International Registries, Inc.
www.register-iri.com

Emergency Contact Details

United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
Tel: +44 2392 222 060
Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org
Website: www.ukmto.org

Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSChOA)
European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ASPIDES / EUNAVFOR ATALANTA
Tel: +33 298 220 220 / +33 298 220 170
Email: postmaster@mschoa.org
Website: www.mschoa.org

US Navy Central Command (NAVCENT)
Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman
Tel: +973 1785 0033
Tel: +973 1785 3879
Email: m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil

This document should be read in conjunction with industry Best Management Practices (BMP) and flag State advice.
THE MASTER RETAINS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VESSELS ACTIONS.

Event Type

- Missile and Drone Attack (Aerial / Surface)
- Approach by Suspicious Craft in Port or at Anchor
- Sea Mines
- Unexploded Ordnance
- Piracy Attack / Unauthorized Boarding
- VHF Hailing / Harassment

Considerations While in an Area of Increased Threat

- Submit reports as per regional guidance and if stipulated in any charter agreement
- Monitor the latest threat information
- Regular checks of all mitigations and especially control of all access points
- Avoid drifting, waiting, anchoring, and slow steaming whenever possible
- Minimize the use of VHF
 - Prefer email or secure satellite phone communications
 - Only respond to known or legitimate callers on VHF, considering the possibility of imposters
 - Maintain social media hygiene (photographs and information on social media can provide details on the vessel's location, intent, and operations)
- Submit ship's stability condition daily to the Company

Considerations Before Entering a Threat Area

- Implement security measures in accordance with the mitigations prescribed in the risk assessment
- Brief the crew and conduct drills
 - Brief the crew on preparations
 - Conduct drills with mitigations in place
 - Review emergency plans and ensure all crew are aware of their duties
 - Ensure familiarity with the alarm signals for an attack and an "all-clear" situation
- Check
 - Essential equipment tested and available
 - Hardening in place, including the security of all access points
 - Lockdown conditions including watertight doors in machinery spaces, considering crew safety
 - Bridge team's security knowledge and crew awareness
 - Crew's response to different threats
- Reschedule planned maintenance of voyage-critical equipment for transit through areas of increased threat
- Determine reporting requirements

Considerations Before Entering a Threat Area (continued)

- Emergency Communication Plan
 - Prepare and test an emergency communication plan with essential contact numbers and prepared messages
 - Display communication plans near all external communication stations, including the safe muster point and/or the citadel
 - Test communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)
 - Consider the provision of a "safe word" held by selected crew for communication authentication with officials
- AIS Policy
 - Review in detail the company AIS policy for operating in threat areas
 - Consider the safety and security implications of broadcasting AIS
 - If AIS is turned OFF, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by dead reckoning
 - If AIS is ON, consider limiting data to ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status, and safety-related information
- Communications Policy
 - Control external communications (especially social media)

1 Missile and Drone Attack (Aerial / Surface)

Missile Threat Explanation:

- Cruise Missile: jet-propelled at sub-sonic speeds throughout their flight
- Ballistic Missile: rocket-propelled during initial launch after which follows an arcing trajectory to its target

Drone Threat Explanation:

- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
 - Commonly known as a drone. An aircraft with no human pilot and remotely controlled or autonomous
 - Some drones can have a built-in warhead that explodes after crashing into its target
- Loitering Munitions
 - Also known as a suicide drone, kamikaze drone, or exploding drone
 - Aerial weapon with a built-in warhead that is typically designed to loiter around a target area until a target is located, then attack the target by crashing into it
- Waterborne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED) or Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV)
 - A USV is always unmanned. WBIEDs are often unmanned or have a solitary occupant
 - Can be loaded with explosives that explode upon crashing into a target

1 Missile and Drone Attack (Aerial / Surface)

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Sound alarm
- Make announcement on PA system (including threat warning)
- Consider switching OFF AIS
- Time permitting: close all fire screen doors
- BRACE FOR IMPACT

POST IMPACT OR NEAR MISS

- Make follow-up announcement
- Rapid threat and damage assessment
- Consider evasive maneuvering (USV-threat only)

IMPACT OR MISS

- Muster crew
- Start ship-specific Emergency Response Checklist
- Commence Incident Log

RESPONSE ACTIONS

- Notify Company and flag State
- Notify UKMTO / MSChOA
- Emergency broadcast on VHF Ch. 16

NOTIFY

IF SAFE TO DO SO:

- Extract VDR and CCTV Data
- Cordon-off impacted area and keep a safe distance from explosives
- Take photos of damage

SECURE EVIDENCE



Bridge Emergency Reference Cards cont.

JMIC

Joint Maritime Information Center

Bridge Emergency Reference Cards

Middle East



Combined Maritime Forces
combinedmaritimeforces.com/combined-task-forces

JMIC Products
www.ukmto.org/partner-products/jmic-products

Created in Partnership with International Registries, Inc.
www.register-iri.com

2 Approach by Suspicious Craft in Port or at Anchor

Suspected Mine or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attached to the Ship's Hull

» IF HIGH SPEED APPROACH
Use Event Type 1 for Missile or Drone Attack (Aerial or Surface)

» IF IED FOUND
Continue with Event Type 4 for Unexploded Ordnance

2 Approach by Suspicious Craft in Port or at Anchor

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Make announcement on PA system (including threat warning)
- Close watertight doors and consider blast routes

SECURITY RESPONSE ACTIONS

- Muster crew
- Start ship-specific checklist as per Ship Security Plan
- Notify local authorities, PFSD and CSO of the presence of suspicious craft
- Commence Incident Log

SECURE VESSEL & CREW

- Maintain all round lookout
- Evacuate engine room spaces
- Keep personnel clear of exposed decks

VESSEL SEARCH

- Request port authorities to conduct a thorough waterline survey
- If port authorities unable to assist, consider using own lifeboat for waterline survey
- If unable to conduct a waterline survey, contact company for further instructions

POST INCIDENT

SECURE EVIDENCE

If safe to do so:

- Extract VDR and CCTV data
- Take photos and submit to CSO
- Inform UKMTO / MSChA

3 Sea Mines

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Sound alarm
- Make announcement on PA system (including threat warning)
- Close watertight doors and consider blast routes
- Evacuate engine room spaces
- BRACE FOR IMPACT**

POST IMPACT OR NEAR MISS

ACTIONS

- Make follow-up announcement
- Rapid threat and damage assessment

RESPONSE ACTIONS

- Muster crew
- Start ship-specific Emergency Response Checklist
- Commence Incident Log

SECURE VESSEL & CREW

- Crew count / missing persons
- Maintain all round lookout

NOTIFY

- Notify Company and flag State
- Notify UKMTO / MSChA
- Emergency broadcast on VHF Ch.16

SECURE EVIDENCE

If safe to do so:

- Extract VDR and CCTV Data
- Cordon-off impacted area and keep a safe distance from explosives
- Take photos of damage

4 Unexploded Ordnance

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Sound alarm
- Make announcement on PA system (including threat warning)
- Inform crew to remain clear from debris
- Close watertight and fire screen doors

SECURE VESSEL & CREW

- Cordon-off impacted area and keep a safe distance from explosives
- Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
- Keep electronic devices away
- Prepare firefighting and damage control equipment

NOTIFY

- Notify Company and flag State
- Notify UKMTO / MSChA and request specialist advice (explosive ordnance disposal team)

SECURE EVIDENCE

If safe to do so:

- Extract VDR and CCTV Data
- Take photos only from a safe distance

5 Piracy Attack / Unauthorized Boarding

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Sound alarm
- Make announcement on PA system (including threat warning)
- Muster crew or direct crew to citadel
- Activate SSAS
- Start fire pumps

SECURE VESSEL & CREW

- Instruct PSCAP, if present, to act as per the Rules for Use of Force

UNAUTHORIZED BOARDING

- Make follow-up announcement
- Start ship-specific checklist as per Ship Security Plan
- Establish proximity of navigational hazards and verify traffic situation
- Maneuver away from the danger
- Comply with instructions
- Notify Company and flag State
- Notify UKMTO / MSChA
- Notify nearest MRCC
- Emergency broadcast on VHF Ch. 16

NOTIFY

SECURE EVIDENCE

If safe to do so:

- Extract VDR and CCTV Data
- Take photos and video

6 VHF Hailing / Harassment

If hailed by an unknown vessel or aircraft exhibiting threatening or harassing behavior

INITIAL ACTIONS

- Call Master and Chief Officer
- Record VHF transmissions
- Verify ship's position (relative to nearest land)

Ignore VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so

If harassment persists

Use RESPONSE 1
Repeat and continue to repeat until no longer tenable

Hailed with demands to prepare to be boarded

Use RESPONSE 2

Unknown authorities continue their approach or close to boarding

Use RESPONSE 3

NOTIFY

- Notify Company and flag State
- Notify UKMTO / MSChA

SECURE EVIDENCE

If safe to do so:

- Extract VDR Data and VHF recordings

6 VHF Hailing / Harassment

If hailed by an unknown vessel or aircraft exhibiting threatening or harassing behavior

RESPONSE 1

[VESSEL CALLING], this is merchant vessel [SHIP'S NAME]. This vessel is engaged in lawful transit. I am navigating as permitted by international law and request you do not impede my safe passage - Over.

RESPONSE 2

This is merchant vessel [SHIP'S NAME]. This vessel is engaged in lawful transit. Request you maintain a safe distance and do not impede our transit. All actions are being recorded and reported [NOTE 1]. This vessel has not experienced a navigational incident and has conducted itself lawfully throughout the voyage. My flag State is [COUNTRY] and Company is [COMPANY NAME]. You may contact them if you require any further information - Over.

RESPONSE 3

This is merchant vessel [SHIP'S NAME]. Your actions are impeding the safe navigation of my vessel and may endanger my vessel and crew. We are in contact with our flag State. I repeat your actions are being recorded and reported to [Note 1]. I formally request that you cease impeding my vessel's safety and interrupting its lawful transit - Over.

» Note 1: UKMTO / MSChA / Allies / Other Navy



Additional Resources

Additional Resources on Incident:

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>

Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org

Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea:

<https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers:

https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2